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Looking South: What can Youth Studies in the Global North learn from research on youth 
and policy in the Middle East and North African countries? 
 





Connell’s ‘Southern Theory’ calls for intellectuals in the ‘Global North’ ‘to start learning in 
new ways, and in new relationships’ (2014) with and from scholars in the ‘Global South’ in 
order to better understand the subjects of our research. This, exactly, is the motivation of 
this paper. In working with, and drawing, on a large, comparative research programme 
about young people and youth policy in some of the Middle East and North African (MENA) 
countries (the POWER2YOUTH research project), we explore what can be learned for 
sociologically-oriented Youth Studies in the ‘Global North’ through collaborative research in 
the ‘Global South’. The paper brings together research and theory from different 
disciplines/fields as well as from different regions/states so as to consider how we might 
better research and theorise about ‘youth’ (as a socially constructed life-phase) and about 
the empirical realities of young people’s lives (as they play out in social, political, cultural 
and economic contexts). Consequently, the paper discusses five themes or issues that we 
see as important for Youth Studies in the ‘Global North’: the variation in dominant 
state/social constructions of ‘youth’; the plurality of social divisions amongst youth; the 
different meanings of insecurity for young people; the flaws in human capital-based youth 
policies; and the significance of informal and non-standard work for young people. In 
conclusion, we summarise our arguments and underscore the value of a political economy 












This paper is about what those who practice youth research and youth policy-making in the 
‘Global North’ might learn from recent, comparative studies of young people and youth 
policy in Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. Empirically, it is rooted in a 
bringing together of our own extensive experience of youth research and scholarship in the 
UK and others’ recent, comparative research based on the POWER2YOUTH (P2Y) research 
project in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Turkey and Lebanon 
about youth exclusion and citizenship1. Theoretically, it is located in an upswell of writing 
and critique about the politics of academic scholarship that is dominated by ‘the view from 
the Global North’, Youth Studies included. Here we ‘look South’ to see what ‘we in the 
North’ might learn (albeit that we recognise, of course, that theorising in terms of a simple 
North/ South binary can sometimes imply too great a degree of similarity between countries 
on the same side of this divide and too great a degree of difference between countries on 
opposite sides2).  
 
We write as trespassers. Our academic field is not politics let alone Mediterranean politics, 
nor Area or Regional Studies. Our careers as social scientists as yet have included no direct, 
face-to-face research with young people in MENA countries, nor even any locations in the 
wider Global South. We are keen students, not expert scholars, when it comes to questions 
about how the social, cultural and economic conditions of these countries shape (and are 
shaped by) the lives of young people. Nor are we known for our previous engagements with 
post-colonial, sub-altern or Southern theory. It is important to stress these caveats and the 
tentative and exploratory nature of our paper. We offer our arguments and observations in 
a spirit of open enquiry knowing that we might be getting things quite wrong3.  
                                                     
1 This programme of research is described in detail in the introduction to this Special Issue. Our paper draws 
heavily in its middle section on the work of Emma Murphy, Jo Phoenix, Mark Calder and Drew Mikhael for our 
POWER2YOUTH project (Calder et al, 2017). 
2 Having acknowledged this, hereafter for stylistic reasons we will not place inverted commas around Global 
North or Global South. 




What we can claim, however, is some experience and standing in that academic sub-field 
called Youth Studies (which we turn to shortly)4 i.e. we have each made our academic 
careers in the UK, drawing on sociology, criminology and social policy to investigate young 
people and youth issues, particularly in respect of inequality, social exclusion and the labour 
market. This paper is inspired by the opportunity enjoyed by one of us (XXX) to participate 
in a major programme of EU-funded comparative youth research; the P2Y research project5. 
The work package (see Calder et al., 2017) sought to identify policy conclusions and 
recommendations from the multiple research projects that constituted the programme.  
 
Our aim here is to set out what the field of Youth Studies in the Global North (specifically 
the UK) might learn from studies of youth and young people in the MENA countries. 
Without wishing to claim too much, our motivation exactly reflects Raewyn Connell’s call for 
Northern intellectuals ‘to start learning in new ways, and in new relationships’ (2014: 219, 
original emphasis). In working with and drawing on the P2Y project we seek to explore what 
can be learned for the Global North through collaborative research in the Global South. The 
paper is organised in four parts. First, cognisant that our readership here is likely not to 
count this as their academic home, we briefly say what we mean by ‘Youth Studies’. 
Secondly, we sketch the very live challenge to Youth Studies, dominated as it is by 
scholarship from the Global North, offered by recent critics writing from the perspective of 
the Global South. Thirdly, in response to this challenge, and as a way of moving these 
debates forward, we suggest five lessons that we here ‘in the North’, can learn from studies 
‘there’, in the South. This leads into the conclusion of the paper which – echoing many of 
the themes of the introduction to this Special Issue - stresses the value of political economy 
approach to understanding young people’s lives and experiences; an approach that can 
expose the falsity of dominant ideologies that individualise and blame young people and can 
reveal the neo-liberal, structuring forces that create the conditions young people face.  
 
 
                                                     
4 For instance, XXXX is… and XXXX is….  





Defining terms and setting the scene 
 
What is Youth Studies?  
 
‘Youth Studies’ is a relatively new field (no more than one hundred or so years old) and it 
draws on several disciplines (such as sociology, cultural studies, psychology, criminology, 
education, social policy, and social geography). The leading international journal is the 
Journal of Youth Studies (JYS) (see MacDonald et al., 2019: 2 for a recent editorial statement 
on the field). JYS is ‘devoted to a theoretical and empirical understanding of young people’s 
experiences and life contexts’ and the way that those in the ‘second and third decades of 
life’ experience ‘contexts, such as education, the labour market and the family’ (ibid.). It is 
interested in how inequality and marginalisation are reproduced and the way that social, 
economic and political processes and institutions shape the meaning of, and narratives 
about, youth. This, then, is a sociological, critical form of Youth Studies that is distinct from 
more psychologically-oriented approaches that tend to stress individual-level issues of 
adolescent development (these are popular in the US and can sometimes merge into 
normative ‘positive development’ approaches to ‘youth problems’).  
 
Whilst never completely separate, it has long been argued that two, broad traditions of 
Youth Studies exist in the UK (MacDonald, 2011): firstly, a youth cultural studies approach, 
originating in the 1970s, that theorises the interaction of class and age-based inequalities in 
the generation of stylistic, working-class youth sub-cultures; and, secondly, the study of 
youth transitions to the labour market and adulthood which, since the 1980s, has 
dominated in terms of academic and policy influence. Ironically, Cooper and colleagues 
(2019: 33) – in their stinging criticism of the flaws of a Global North dominated Youth 
Studies – decry its lack of attention to ‘the urgent material problems of unemployment’. 
This allegation betrays ignorance of this extensive tradition of youth transitions research in 
the UK and elsewhere which has had, as a staple feature over several decades, the problems 





So, what are the core questions for Youth Studies? What is its main purpose? The most 
persuasive answer, we think, is that the youth phase of the life-course offers a privileged 
window on social change or continuity (e.g. of family forms, gender roles, class positions), 
and therefore studying youth allows us to ask and answer questions of wide social scientific 
significance (MacDonald, 2011). A second answer, of which we have become even more 
convinced because of the P2Y project, is that by studying youth we can see how powerful 
social forces construct narratives and policies about ‘youth’ that then serve the interests of 
the powerful. In sum, the empirical realities of young people’s transitions to adulthood can 
reveal wider social change and continuity and the dominant social constructions of youth 
can reveal the motives and strategies of the powerful.  
 
‘North’, ‘South’, and Sociology’s imperial heritage: a brief note on some terms 
 
We are acutely conscious of the politics of labels. Older and newer terms – ‘Third World’, 
‘Developing World’, ‘Periphery’, ‘Subaltern’ and even ‘Global South’ – all position a great 
swathe of heterogeneous countries in relation to, against, an also uniform, wealthy, 
‘developed’, ‘First World’, ‘North’ or ‘West’. ‘Global South’ continues to be used by the UN 
and typically refers to economically disadvantaged nation-states that have been ‘negatively 
impacted by contemporary capitalist globalization’, often through processes of capitalist 
colonialism (Mahler, 2019). It is a concept that draws attention to countries’ 
‘interconnected histories of colonialism, neo-imperialism, and differential economic and 
social change through which large inequalities in living standards, life expectancy, and 
access to resources are maintained’ (Dados and Connell, 2012: 12).  
 
Butler (2019) reminds us that ‘no name is perfect and neither the North nor the South is 
geographically precise’. Lists of those countries that fall within the Global South/Global 
North occasionally differ and economic development can mean countries shifting, over 
time, from ‘South’ to ‘North’.  In the same vein, the broad-brush strokes of ‘Global North 
versus Global South’ can hide finer details of difference within the ‘South’ and within the 
‘North’. For instance, rates of young people being ‘not in education, employment or training 
(‘NEET’) vary drastically within Europe. In April 2019, nearly 29% of young adults in Italy and 
27% in Greece were in this situation with only 8% of young Swedes and 8.6% of young Dutch 
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people being NEET (European Commission, 2019). Müller (2018: 1) is also concerned with 
the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ and how a simple North/ South split has erased what he calls 
the ‘Global East’: ‘those countries and societies that occupy an interstitial position between 
North and South’. A similar example might be the wealthy ‘Gulf Cooperation Council’ 
countries of the Middle East (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates). The life-worlds of young adults in Kuwait (with average annual per capita income 
of nearly US$25,000) are likely to be different to those of young Ethiopians (with an 
equivalent rate of US$522) even though both states are nominally within the Global South6. 
Keeping with the Kuwaiti example, Alnaser (2018) shows how young Kuwaitis’ experiences 
do not fit with either the ‘typical story’ of the Global South (e.g. they are far from 
economically disadvantaged) or the Global North (e.g. Kuwaiti youth unemployment is 
largely voluntary). Rather, she says, Kuwait is ‘located somewhere between the northern 
and southern norms… with some aspects similar in both contexts and others which are 
totally different’ (ibid: 59).  It is not our purpose to engage in a full critique of terms and 
definitions. With these cases we are simply indicating our awareness of some of the 
limitations and problems of an incautious approach to conceptualising ‘the Global South/ 
North’. We do see enormous value in trying to draw comparative lessons through empirical 
insights, for research and policy in the UK (and more widely in the Global North), from the 
experiences of young people in these MENA countries which, broadly speaking and for the 
purposes of our paper, we call part of the Global South7 (notwithstanding the differences 
that we know exist between these countries and between them and other parts of the 
Global South). 
        
These problems of categorising, dividing and naming remind us of how ‘the long shadow of 
colonial history falls across whole domains of knowledge’ (Connell, 2017: 29). Even some 
brief acknowledgement of this colonial heritage within Sociology (and therefore Youth 
Studies) is necessary. Postcolonial theory shows us that colonialism continues today through 
neoliberal globalisation, critiques the structures of dominant western discourse and 
develops ‘indigenous’ concepts and knowledge. The colonial past of European Sociology is 
                                                     
6 Figures from the World Bank (n.d.). The equivalent figure for the UK is around US$34k. 
7 Turkey, one of our six sites, tends to be classified as Global North despite the historic significance of Istanbul 
as cross-road between Asia and Europe and its listing by the OECD as an ‘ODA country’.   
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rarely uncovered and, Bhambra argues (2007, p.143), a post-colonial Sociology should 
rework the basic assumptions of our descriptions and theories to develop post-colonial, 
‘connected sociologies’. For Chakrabarty (2000), this requires Sociology to ‘decentre’ and 
‘provincialise’ Europe, allowing some remedy of the neglect of societies outside the Global 
North. Some examples of this include scholarship on the autonomous social-scientific 
developments emanating from the Arab world, and south and south-east Asia (Alatas, 
2006), and the argument that, in the current climate of economic instability in the North, 
ways of theorising in the Global South, particularly in Africa, may show the way forward 
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 2011). What a post-colonial Sociology should be and do is hotly 
contested (see, for example, Aravamudan, 2012; Ferguson, 2012; Obarrio, 2012), and 
Mbembe’s (2012) argument, for instance, that an inward, Afro-centric model should not 
simply replace a Euro-centric one.  
 
Connell (2007)’s Southern Theory is one of the most influential works here. Much core social 
theory ‘embeds perspectives on the world that arise from the social formations of the global 
North, because of their historical position in imperialism and their current core position in 
the neoliberal world economy’ (Connell 2018: 402). The impact of this, according to Connell, 
is fourfold: ‘the claim of universality’; ‘reading from the centre’; ‘gestures of exclusion’; and 
‘grand erasure’. In the post-colonial world, this structural inequality is sustained by 
disparities in wealth and institutional support. Instead, Connell argues, we need an 
approach that champions voices, experiences and theory from and for the South. 
Ultimately, the knowledge economy must be considered through a historic lens, one 
dominated by ongoing struggle and transformation, exemplified recently, for instance, by 
the Rhodes Must Fall movement at the University of Cape Town8 to the media heat over 











A more global Youth Studies? The ‘nascent debate’  
 
[The concepts of] Youth Studies must mean something tangible to the teenager in 
Delhi or Nairobi or Bogota, not just to the academic sitting in London or Melbourne 
or Manhattan (Everatt, 2015: 77). 
 
Our interest in a more global, inclusive Youth Studies is not a completely new nor original 
one. Over the last two decades or so, there have been several occasions of this same call for 
a more global perspective in Youth Studies. Perhaps ahead of its time, the first-ever UK 
undergraduate degree in Youth Studies (at Teesside University in 1998) contained a core 
module that explicitly compared youth experiences in ‘more’ and ‘less economically 
developed countries’.  In 2004, writing of Australia, Wyn and Harris urged youth researchers 
to engage with their country’s distinctive, colonial history. In the same year, a special issue 
of Youth and Society, based on an earlier research symposium in which one of the authors 
participated, had the express intention of analysing ‘young people’s transitions from the 
perspective of both the First World and Third World [sic]’ (Jeffreys and McDowell, 2004: 
131). Shortly afterwards, Nilan and Feixa’s Global Youth? (2006) described subaltern ‘youth 
landscapes’ which had previously been invisible in ‘Western’ youth cultural studies. In 2014, 
the Newcastle Youth Studies Group held the symposium Youth Outside the Northern 
Metropole to ‘articulate some of the key concerns for urban, regional and rural young 
people in Australia, Asia and the Pacific’.  More recently, Phillips (2018) and Cooper et al. 
(2019) have each argued that scholars outside of the North should develop their own 
methods, knowledge and theories specific to the contexts in which they research and, at the 
time of writing, two new editions about youth in the Global South are on the verge of 
publication (Cuervo et al., forthcoming; Swartz et al, forthcoming).  
 
Thus, Youth Studies is already a global field of scholarship, but institutionalised knowledge 
remains skewed towards the Global North, reflecting material inequalities, the globally 
uneven power of universities and the hitherto flow of global cultural influence (Côté, 2014 
see the critique by Cooper et al, 2019; MacDonald et al, 2019). Predominantly, key texts, 
journals, and leading theories have been based on youth research carried out in, and 
reflecting epistemologies and methodologies developed in, the Global North and published 
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with an implicit ‘claim of universality’ (Connell, 2007), ignoring the history and context-
specific nature of that knowledge and that the histories and contexts of the Global South 
might generate quite different understandings of youth. Woodman and Wyn (2014: 35) 
suggest, however, that Connell’s critique does not necessitate the abandonment of 
Northern-based theories; ‘we may be able to enrich and rework those we have’. In this vein, 
Phillips argues for greater attention to the voluminous research literature on ‘African Youth’ 
and that post-colonial theory and Area Studies scholarship can be both ‘a corrective and a 
source of inspiration for Youth Studies [and] can thus be a fruitful starting point to develop 
more inclusive concepts and understandings of youth’ (2018: 12).  
 
We welcome and agree with much of the challenge offered by Global South researchers and 
are keen to imagine and practice more inclusive, global studies of youth. Patently, there is 
much Youth Studies and youth policy in the Global North can learn from the experiences 
and contexts of young people in the Global South; this is the prime aim and core of our 
paper. As we have described, however, we are anxious to avoid overly homogenising 
depictions of the life-worlds of young people on one side or the other of a hard North/ 
South divide. One of the contributions of Youth Studies (in the North) – and a feature of our 
own work – has been to show how inequalities between young people in the UK are 
reproduced, against changing social and economic conditions and according to multiple, 
intersecting lines of division (by class, gender, ethnicity, place, sexuality, dis/ability and so 
on). This exact fact is also revealed in relation to youth in the MENA countries, as we discuss 
later in the paper.  
 
Despite the mounting agreement about the necessity and possibility of a more global Youth 
Studies, we agree with Joschka Phillips that the debate remains ‘nascent’ (2018: 12); it often 
does not go much beyond criticism of the current state of affairs, a re-statement of the 
need for a more global perspective or sketched at the level of ‘hints’ for what might be done 
As Global North scholars, our commitment in the longer term would be towards 
comparative scholarship that would engage energetically with studies of youth and young 
people from the South in order: firstly, to be able to see better the global economic, social, 
cultural, and political processes that have created and continue to shape the national and 
regional contexts in which young people, in the North and in the South, live their lives; 
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secondly, to reveal not only the undoubted differences but also the potential parallels 
between contexts, state discourses about youth and young people’s experiences in the 
South and the North; and thirdly, going beyond the limits of a simple binary division, to 
investigate the differences that might exist within and between the countries categorised 
together as the Global South, or as the Global North. That is all a longer-term project. In the 
meantime, we offer something that we hope helps move this debate beyond the ‘nascent’ 
by outlining what we learned, in practice, from one comparative study of youth.   
 
What can ‘we’ learn from studies of young people and youth policy in MENA countries?  
 
We now turn to the core of the paper; five lessons that we suggest we can learn for Youth 
Studies in the Global North from the P2Y research10.  
 
Dominant discourses of youth vary, reflecting different regional/state settings and 
histories 
 
As we noted earlier, dominant social and political discourses frame how we understand 
‘youth’ – in youth policy, youth welfare practice and in academic Youth Studies. Since the 
emergence of ‘youth’ as a recognised age category in the North’s early industrial era, social 
commentators have constructed young people as a vulnerable group in a hostile world and, 
simultaneously, as an uncivilised presence requiring discipline (Pearson, 1983). Twin 
discourses of ‘care’ and ‘control’ have shaped the governance of this social category 
through successive waves of state intervention in the UK (Griffin, 1993).  
 
In these MENA countries, there are also two dominant representations of youth, also often 
operating simultaneously and in contradiction, but they are of a different character. Youth 
become presented as either as ‘the hope of’ or ‘threat to the nation’. Studies of national 
youth policies and strategies ‘show that [these] archetypes of young people are created and 
promoted by the state institutions’ (Calder et al, 2017: 10). Consequently, for countries 
                                                     




emerging from colonial oppression and struggles for independence, ‘youth’ are implicated 
in the process of nation-building (reminiscent of the way that Nazi or Stalinist totalitarian 
regimes in the mid-20th Century constructed their youth political organisations as the 
vanguard of the future). The State ‘looks positively’ upon young people who conform to the 
patriarchal, authoritarian practices and conservative outlooks promoted by governments, 
for instance, as evidenced by membership of regime political parties. The State ‘looks 
negatively’ upon and seeks to control, discipline and criminalise those young people who 
dissent politically or engage in youth cultural activities deemed to be at odds with 
traditional, conservative values (Swedenburg, 2017).  
 
The P2Y research demonstrated how these discourses of ‘youth as hope of/threat to the 
nation’ are manifest in the prime functions of youth ministries and institutions; i.e. to corral, 
incorporate and subordinate young people, dulling the possibility for dissent and conflict. 
For example, planning policies and practices in MENA countries sometimes actively pursue a 
policy of ‘containment’, spatially restricting young people to areas where they ‘are invisible’ 
and ‘can do no harm’, excluding them from spaces where their presence is ‘not required for 
business to progress’ (Calder et al, 2017: 14). This tendency has been accentuated since the 
youth-led protests of 2011 (‘the Arab Spring’); a moment that was emblematic of young 
people’s refusal, across the region, to be subservient to such state repression. 
Subsequently, international political attention led to a burgeoning of policy investment in 
youth-targeted state agencies. Yet many such agencies are ‘little more than shells, lacking 
proper data and information about youth, remaining heavily politicised and lacking serious 
resources to address priority areas’ (ibid.). Formal state institutions are often ‘riddled with 
patrimonial modes of behaviour at best, and outright corruption at worst, and young people 
have little or no trust in them’ (ibid: 23).  
 
The politics of ‘youth’ representations plays out in the practice of youth work11; again, with 
differences between the MENA countries and the UK. In its 1970s heyday at least, UK youth 
work was a force for social welfare and, at times, even carried a radical imperative for 
                                                     
11 We use ‘youth work’ to mean youth services and workers who engage with young people to support their 




progressive social change, shared across left-wing public sector workers, under the motto 
‘in and against the state’ (The London-Edinburgh Weekend Return Group, 1979). 
Conversely, in some MENA countries, youth work now is sometimes perceived as another 
arm of Althusser’s ‘Repressive State Apparatus’ (Buchanan, 2010), working against the real 
interests of young people. This is one instance of the challenges that faced us as Global 
North academics designated the complicated job of devising youth policy recommendations 
for the EU. Currently in the UK, a sensible policy suggestion vis-à-vis numerous youth 
problems (especially after years of austerity cuts to youth services) might be ‘invest in youth 
work and youth services’. Not so in some of our MENA case study areas, where ‘youth work’ 
acts as part of the punitive State.  
 
Popular concepts in the Global North, such as ‘insecurity’, can have qualitatively 
different meanings in the South  
 
That young people’s lives are increasingly insecure and risky is one of the dominant motifs 
of Youth Studies research in the Global North. Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society (1990) had an 
enormous impact, sparking debate about the extent to which old social structures of social 
class were relevant in young people’s lives. ‘Insecurity’ has predominantly been discussed in 
relation to youth transitions from school to work and how these have become less 
predictable and more individualised (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007).  
 
The P2Y studies also concluded that, overall, ‘insecurity – physical, political, economic and 
social – was the dominant motif that emerged from the research across these countries’ 
(Calder et al, 2017: 26). Clearly, globally, young people are experiencing insecure transitions 
that continue to be shaped by structural inequalities, most often connected to class, gender, 
race, ethnicity and place. Nevertheless, the P2Y programme revealed some quite different 
experiences. Young people regularly reported ‘a sense of not belonging, and of being 
separate from the rules and structures within which they live their everyday lives’ (ibid: 25). 
State narratives of ‘youth as hope of the nation’ have little resonance for them and the 
‘cultures of conservative patriarchal society’ in which they are immersed ‘are at odds with 
their evolving and globally connected identities and their need to move beyond the confines 
of the family’ (ibid.). More profoundly, in their daily lives, young people in MENA countries 
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often endured extreme levels of political and personal insecurity manifest in physical, not 
just symbolic, violence. This was reproduced and exacerbated by the State and its security 
services and institutions and was of a different magnitude to that found in much of the 
Global North. For us, as newcomer researchers, it was this which most strikingly 
differentiated the lives of young people here from the lives of those in the Global North. 
Calder et al. comment as follows (2017: 21):  
 
Young people are constantly aware of implicit and explicit ‘red-lines’, which if 
crossed, can result in violence even in everyday settings. Examples include: young 
women, who are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence; Palestinian youths, 
travelling to University, having to face armed soldiers at an Israeli check-point; or 
Egyptian bloggers arrested and tortured in prison.  
 
Public space is contested and short victories for young people after the 2011 uprisings have 
been reversed, with public transport and urban spaces (even youth-oriented spaces, such as 
university campuses) commonly now being sites of physical insecurity, risk and danger, 
especially for young women. As we note later, often women’s experiences of 
marginalisation are qualitatively different to those of men, particularly in relation to issues 
of insecurity and safety. Physical and sexual harassment is common-place. In the aftermath 
of the Arab Spring, sexual assaults on women protestors have been rife, with those attacked 
often constructed as ‘prostitutes’ (Salih et al, 2017: 15), and those who might support them 
(such as journalists, activists and charity workers) facing accusations of sexual abuse 
(Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016: 16). Freedom of movement and association is curtailed. One 
Lebanese young woman interviewed in the P2Y research (Calder et al, 2017: 21) described 
how she and her friends had to steel themselves to go out (against the anticipated risks) and 
would only do so in groups of at least four people. In some MENA countries, the majority of 
respondents to the P2Y surveys preferred to spend most of their leisure time in the safety of 
the home (55% of respondents in Morocco, 73% in Palestine Occupied Territories), often 
because they feared the threat of state police and security forces. A young Palestinian 
woman said: ‘my neighbours make me feel secure. The Israeli soldiers come to the home 
and we do not feel safe. Girls on the street also do not always feel safe in the street, I mean 
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at night because of harassment. Girls cannot go freely anywhere at night’ (Calder et al, 
2017: 21).  
 
It is true that young people in the Global North sometimes also have cause to fear for their 
personal safety, as the US Black Lives Matters campaign has well demonstrated. Some 
groups of young people in the UK are also subject to unjust, racist policing. Street crime and 
violence, too, disproportionately impacts on young people. The extent and the severity of 
the risks faced by young people in MENA countries (including to their existential safety and 
security) seem, however, to be of a different order of magnitude. This was particularly true 
for countries in or moving away from conflict. As one young Lebanese man said: ‘You don’t 
know if a bomb will explode in the road and kill you’ (Calder et al., 2017: 26).  
 
‘Youth’ is heterogenous and socially divided; the variety and depth of social 
divisions appears to be greater in MENA countries than in the Global North 
 
Well-known social divisions continue to structure young people’s lives and transitions to 
adulthood in the Global North, regardless of individualizing tendencies that enable 
apparently greater personal agency (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007). Nevertheless, there has 
been some weakening of gender inequalities, in some respects, for young people in the UK. 
This is apparent, for example, in patterns of educational achievement at school and at 
university. The relative success of young women has fed discourses about ‘a crisis of 
masculinity’, focused especially on young white, working class men.  
 
This does not seem to be the case in the MENA countries studied by P2Y, where inequalities 
by gender are deep and pervasive. The P2Y programme looked closely at the complex 
intersectionality of myriad sources of difference between young people, i.e. by nationality, 
gender, social class, ethnicity, religion and other factors. Thus, the research was alive to the 
‘multiple marginalisations’ that structure the experience of being young in the MENA 
countries (Calder et al, 2017:16). Amongst these, gender was often to the fore in 
experiences of inequality (to be clear, in describing this we are explicitly not arguing that 
young women in the Global North are free of the constraints and pressures of Patriarchy). 
This could be felt in the direct threats to security that women face in public space (as noted 
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above) and, indirectly, in the increasingly conservative approach to family and personal 
status policies implemented by several MENA states since the turn of the century. These 
have included legal restrictions on women (e.g. the right to pass on their nationality, in 
Lebanon), the reduction of female reproductive rights and the endorsement of patriarchal 
social norms (for example, in Turkey, the state has instituted financial support for women to 
stay at home and take care of children) (Catusse and Destremau, 2016). Family law is 
strongly influenced by religious law which enforces ‘heteronormativity’ and gender-based 
ideologies. This means that young women are more likely to be obliged into marriage 
(legally from the age of 9 in some states) as a means of reducing ‘the burden’ they place on 
the family home. A young Egyptian woman explained that ‘whenever she discusses the 
rights of women, people take it from a religious perspective and hence, they turn feminism 
into anti religion’ (Sika, 2016: 13). Such gendered experiences are not exclusively cultural 
and/or religious and early marriage, for example, is embedded within class and economic 
conditions. 
 
Superficially, there are similar trends here, as in much of the Global North, towards the 
prolonged dependence of young adults on their parents and the parental home (across the 
MENA countries studied, at least two-thirds of survey respondents were still living at home). 
The key difference is that here that dependence is maintained in a strongly patriarchal 
context where seniority spells privilege (for men) and young people (especially young 
women) are required to defer to traditional, unequal gender roles (including of strict limits, 
because of honour codes, on sexual activity). Here there is none of the sexual freedom and 
identity experimentation associated with North American versions of ‘Emerging Adulthood’ 
(Arnett, 2001).  The unequal impact of marriage and the ensuing burden of care also 
amplifies the gender gap in education and employment. For instance, UK rates of being ‘not 
in education, employment or training’ (‘NEET’) for young men and women have converged 
but in MENA countries the rate is often much higher for young women (41% compared to 
14% for young men; Erdoğan et al, 2017: 8). Calder et al (2017: 22) conclude that:  
 
the reality for young women is that – despite being more likely to achieve a higher 
level of education than their mothers – they continue to be under-represented in the 
labour force, to be subordinated to patriarchal norms and practices in both home 
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and the public sphere, to be vulnerable to emotional and physical abuse, to face 
sexual harassment in employment or public social spaces, to be poor and to lack 
financial and bodily security. 
 
 
Investment in human capital (extended education, university qualifications) does 
not guarantee labour market success 
 
In the EU, with the UK being a perfect example, perhaps the predominant ‘youth problem’ 
perceived by governments has been social exclusion, manifested most clearly as non-
participation in the labour market. This is true for much of the Global North despite wide 
variance in levels and experiences of youth unemployment between countries (as we noted 
earlier). UK policy makers coined the term ‘NEET’ (‘not in employment, education or 
training’) as a short hand for this situation. The proposed solution has been to re-engage 
‘NEET’ young people in education and training courses. The underlying premise is this is a 
problem of underdeveloped human capital; a shortage of the education, skills and 
qualifications needed by the economy. One of the authors (XXXX) has described it as 
‘voodoo sociology’; a form of magical thinking that shifts the blame for the deep, 
entrenched, structural problems of the labour market onto the supposed deficiencies of 
young people. The findings of the P2Y studies help to confirm this critique of the policy 
orthodoxy.  
 
Compared with the welfarist policies of the post-war period, employment policy in MENA 
states is no longer about the public provision of employment but is occupied in the neo-
liberal project of transferring to individuals greater responsibility for their own economic 
welfare (Calder et al, 2017). Converging with countries across Europe, policy has come to 
focus on equipping potential employees (young people) with the skills, capacities and 
attributes said to be required by employers in the private sector or for establishing their 
own small businesses. Such approaches, ignoring as they do pre-existing inequalities and the 
structural causes of youth unemployment, have the potential to deepen the problems that 
young people face. Most small businesses started by young adults fail (MacDonald and 
Coffield, 1991). In hostile conditions (associated with corruption, over-regulation, lack of 
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capitalisation, access to markets etc.), few are likely to succeed. The financial and 
psychological costs can be heavy (ibid.). A fundamental problem is that most MENA 
economies remain weak, have underdeveloped private sector industry and governments 
(pursuing or embracing increasingly neoliberal agendas) have often only been able to 
encourage inward investment from multinationals that provide lower skilled work. In short, 
these economies have weaknesses in the quantity and the quality of employment 
opportunities available to young adults. This is coupled, however, with a strong cultural 
tradition and memory of the availability of better-quality employment for university 
graduates, stemming from the decades of post-war state welfarist investment in education 
and the economy. There is still an expectation that educational qualifications will bring 
employment success and security.  
 
Yet it is sometimes the most educated and qualified who face the greatest chances of 
unemployment (Boubakri, 2017, in Salih et al., 2017). This really is a very striking difference 
to much of the European context. In the UK, for instance, university degrees no longer 
guarantee a graduate job – but they do provide greater protection against unemployment. 
Despite differences in youth unemployment rates across Europe, more or less, the higher 
the level of qualification the lower chance of unemployment. Thus, in 2017 the UK 
government estimated 4% of graduates were unemployed (ONS, 2017). In comparison, in 
Lebanon 51% of those who had completed higher educational qualification had had no work 
or employment in the preceding 12 months, in Morocco it was 49%, in Egypt 47% and a 
staggering 70% in Palestine (Calder et al, 2017: 17-18). Craig Jeffrey (2009, in Sukarieh and 
Tannock, 2015) has commented that: 
 
one of the most unsettling paradoxes of contemporary social change in the global 
south is that at almost the precise moment that people formerly excluded from 
schooling have come to recognise the possibilities held out by education for 
individual improvement, opportunities for these groups to benefit economically from 
schooling are disintegrating.  
 
A further aggravating factor is the lack of any form of social insurance (Calder et al., 2017). 
Young unemployed people in MENA countries are more likely to materially depend on 
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family or experience poverty. With food subsidies and anti-poverty interventions in the 
region targeted at the poorest, middle-class young people – including university graduates - 
face increasing precarity and spiralling private debt. These contexts have generated, in 
Global South research, the important concept of ‘waithood’. Aspirations raised by global 
consumer culture and cultural memories of state-provided employment post-university are 
blocked by declining opportunities resulting in prolonged, frustrating dependency and 
under-employment. Murphy (2018: 34) describes this as an ‘acute form of ontological 
insecurity’ and ‘a potentially permanent state of hyper-precarious living’. Honwana (2019), 
amongst others, demonstrates how experiences of waithood differ by class, gender and 
education and far from merely ‘waiting’, young people are improvising, surviving and 
rebelling in myriad ways. This is a far cry from North American, psychology-research 
depictions of a new optimistic life-phase of ‘Emerging Adulthood’; of possibilities and 
experimentation, of ‘high hopes and great expectations’ (Arnett, 2001).  
 
This pattern of employment/unemployment by educational level is extraordinarily 
important. It lays bare the fallacy of the dominant youth policy orthodoxy that operates in 
the UK, EU and more widely. The implications of this for young people, for social mobility 
and inequality, for the success of these economies and the cohesion of MENA societies are 
enormous, as they are for youth in the Global North. 
  
 ‘Non-standard’, ‘precarious’ employment is not a new development in the Global 
South  
 
Especially since the global economic crash and ensuing austerity programmes in many 
Northern states, high unemployment, an informalised economy, entrenched poverty and 
material inequality - once considered the preserve of the South - are increasingly evident in 
countries in the North (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2011). Thus, one of the most significant 
trends in labour markets in the Global North has been the growth of casualised, informal 
and non-standard forms of working (MacDonald and Giatzogalu, 2019); features which have 
long-dominated economies in the Global South. The International Labour Organisation 
observes: ‘in advanced economies, the standard employment model is less and less 
dominant… wage and salaried employment accounts for only about half of global 
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employment’ (2015a, quoted in Herod and Lambert, 2016: 1). These trends towards de-
standardisation and work insecurity are a key focus for Guy Standing’s influential thesis 
about the rise of a new global class, at the bottom, called The Precariat (2011). In Northern 
Youth Studies we have come to emphasise the precarity and insecurity of young people’s 
lives; yet for decades research in the South has often been undertaken in conditions where 
‘relative chaos, gross economic disparities, displacement, uncertainty and surprise’ are the 
norm (Bennett, 2008: 7).  
 
Underemployment – not complete unemployment – is a key concept here. This can refer to: 
workers working in jobs for which they are patently overqualified (such as ‘GRINGOS’ - 
graduates in non-graduate occupations); part-time workers not being able to get enough 
hours; and, a longer-term experience of churning between insecure jobs and 
unemployment. Getting decent data on these trends in EU states is difficult, for many 
reasons. Unemployment tends to be the focus of labour market analysis not 
underemployment. This is even more true of the MENA economies. It is likely, however, 
that there are high rates of underemployment (in the sense of overqualification for the job) 
given the high rates of graduate unemployment that are evident; many such workers may 
‘trade down’ to lower level jobs. The MENA region displays lower employment and higher 
unemployment rates than any other region in the world; it has by far the highest youth 
unemployment rates (ILO, 2015b). Like the Global South as a whole, these countries have 
high levels of informality (in respect of work and working conditions) compared with 
countries in Europe (but less than compared with some other Global South regions). A 
typical country in MENA produces about one-third of its GDP and employs 65% of its labour 
force informally (Gatti et al, 2014). Job growth has tended to be in low-skilled and lower 
value-added sectors that have high rates of informality (such as construction, commerce 
and transport). The World Bank estimates that on average 32% of employment in MENA 
countries can be classified as informal self-employment (compared with around 13% in 
‘developed countries’) (Gatti et al, 2014). 
 
The situation for younger workers in these economies is particularly difficult. Neo-liberal 
economic policies are pursued by government, led down this route by international partners 
and organisations, which means a declining role for the state and public-sector employment 
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and a greater role for the private sector. This has also meant that some of the formal and 
legal protections and advantages of state sponsored employment are lost or are in decline. 
As noted, however, the private sector remains weak. One result is that those (older) 
workers currently occupying ‘better jobs’ in the public sector hang on to them. Competition 
is extremely fierce for decent private sector jobs, and inequalities to do with age, education, 
bilingualism, urban location, family and other connections, determine who is successful and 
who is not. Overall, younger workers as newer entrants to the labour market lose out to 
older workers and get lower wages, fewer work-related benefits and weaker job security.  
Neo-liberal policies in the Global North further increase the precarious nature of 
employment for young people in the MENA states. Over the last twenty years, EU (and Gulf 
countries’) immigration policies have become increasingly hostile, curtailing migration for 
young Arabs and Turks (De Bel-Air, 2016). To shorten the duration of their stays in the EU, 
temporary and seasonal labour migration programmes for low-skilled workers have 
expanded, thus increasing employment precariousness and insecurity among young 
migrants (Paciello and Pioppi, 2017: 10).  
 
Unlike the typical experience for their counterparts in the Global North, for some young 
people in MENA economies this informality and insecurity is intensified by the fact that 
‘access to any employment (precarious or otherwise) is often… dependent on wasta (that is, 
personal connections) or formal political affiliation’ (Calder et al, 2017: 17). Young people 
resent this system, recognising that it is bad for social and economic life, but at the same 
time use it when necessary to improve their own lives. Strikingly, over 90% of P2Y survey 
respondents felt that ‘wasta’ was by far the single most important factor in accessing 
employment (Boubakri, 2017). As a young Palestinian interviewee commented, ‘if they 
[people] don’t think wasta exists, they’re benefitting from it’ (Giacaman et al., 2017: 24). 
 
Through studying the experiences of MENA states and the Global South more generally 
where informal work has been normal and widespread for decades, there is a clear 
opportunity for scholars in the Global North to better understand the social, political, 
psychological, and economic experiences, processes and outcomes of this precarity and 
informality (see Cooper et al, 2019: 29). Ken Roberts’ (2009) book Youth in Transition makes 
the critically important point that patterns of youth transition in Eastern Europe might be 
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indicative of the direction of travel for youth transitions in Western Europe (e.g. in respect 
of high rates of university participation, graduate underemployment, prolonged 
dependence on parents for housing). With the example given in this section, we may have 
another case that runs counter to orthodox assumptions of development theory; in respect 
of the informality and insecurity of young adults’ working lives, the Global North may be on 




Conclusion: the value of a Political Economy perspective 
 
With this paper, we have joined in with the growing effort in Global North Youth Studies to 
better engage with research, scholarship and theory from the Global South in order to 
provide more global, convincing accounts of youth and of young people’s lives. We hope to 
have approached this task with some humility, seeking to learn – as newcomers to debates 
and research in/of/for the Global South – what some important lessons might be. From 
collaborative research in the MENA countries (the P2Y research project) we have identified 
five themes or conclusions that we think are particularly relevant. These are that:  
 
 dominant discourses of youth vary, reflecting different regional/state settings and 
histories;  
 popular concepts in the Global North, such as ‘insecurity’, can have qualitatively 
different meanings in the South; 
 ‘Youth’ is heterogenous and socially divided; the variety and depth of social divisions 
appears to be greater in MENA countries than in the Global North;  
 Investment in human capital (extended education, university qualifications) does not 
guarantee labour market success; and, 





In the remaining paragraphs, we make one wider, final conclusion; that the sort of political 
economy perspective that is typical of the P2Y programme and of much research about 
young people in the MENA countries could be of great value for Youth Studies in the Global 
North.  
 
In the past five years, a lively debate has played out in the pages of the Journal of Youth 
Studies, about the value of, and what might be meant by, a political economy perspective 
(see Côté, 2014 and 2016; France and Threadgold, 2016; Sukarieh and Tannock, 2015; Kelly, 
2018). There is not space here to give a detailed assessment but one observation that we 
would make is that there seems to be a wider tendency in our field to create theoretical 
‘debates’ and ‘arguments’ where, in reality, there may be a good deal of consensus behind 
some of the position-taking. There can be more heat than light. As Sukarieh and Tannock 
(2015: 1281-2) put it, regardless of the arguments, most commentators would surely agree 
with Côté (2014) in the general value of paying more attention in Youth Studies to political 
economy. Conversely – and importantly – Sukarieh and Tannock also argue that fields of 
scholarship that have ‘long-established traditions of political economy’ can benefit from 
importing work from Youth Studies so as to better understand the ‘significance and meaning 
of youth… within the broader context of society, culture, politics and the economy’ (2015: 
1288). For us, one of the most important theoretical trends in Northern Youth Studies is this 
move towards a political economy perspective. A critical component of this would be a more 
determined analysis of the role of the economy and the state in creating the social category 
of ‘youth’, and designating its membership, and the conditions wherein youth ‘can be 
subordinated to the changing needs of the labour market’ (Murphy, 2017: 1); in the current 
conjecture, that is, to the needs of a neo-liberal, global capitalism. We can see the promise 
of this across the work of the P2Y programme and more widely in analyses of the situations 
of young people in the MENA countries, which have an advanced understanding of the 
complex and nuanced dynamics of a political economy approach (e.g. Sukarieh and Tannock, 
2016; Murphy, 2017). 
 
Specifically, we agree with Côté (2014) that liberal Youth Studies scholars have not 
adequately addressed the question of who or what has caused the conditions that lie behind 
the trends and situations described. This criticism runs parallel our own disapproval of ‘weak 
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versions’ of the concept of social exclusion (XXXX) and the ‘voodoo sociology’ of current 
policy thinking (XXXX). Part of the problem here can be traced back to methodological and 
theoretical preferences in Youth Studies (in the North). Imagining that young people’s 
‘voices’ have epistemological superiority, often there has been a privileging of direct 
research with young people, through interviews and surveys etc, as the way ‘to do’ Youth 
Studies (see Sukarieh and Tannock, 2015). A broader political economy perspective helpfully 
widens the cast of characters ‘in’ Youth Studies; drawing attention to the actors and 
processes that create the social, economic, political, cultural conditions of youth. In Youth 
Studies in the North, we are heavy on studies of young people and light on studies of 
employers, policy makers, state welfare professionals, educators, politicians, the police, 
corporate leaders, and so on. A particular theoretical risk in prioritising ‘young people’s 
voices’ is that youth research can inadvertently repeat the ‘epistemological fallacy’ often 
found there; i.e. young people sometimes voice individualised, neo-liberal, meritocratic 
perceptions of the world that fail to see how their lives and worlds are socially structured. In 
turn, this academic research can then lend a hand to government policy ‘solutions’ for 
‘youth problems’ that focus at the individual rather than the social structural level. 
 
A political economy perspective is a valuable corrective to this overly individualised, liberal 
approach. Through its application in the MENA countries, as we have shown, it can 
document how discourses of youth as ‘hope of/threat to the nation’ are created to serve 
state interests. For instance, US-originated ‘youth bulge’ theories have gained much traction 
over the last three decades, driving international policy in the MENA countries. Associated 
statistical and econometric models were used to demonstrate and ‘predict’ that the higher 
the youth population, the greater the risk of violent conflict. This has legitimised repressive 
‘youth policy’ in the global South (Imoh and Ame, 2012) in general and, as Murphy (2017) 
describes in relation to Tunisia, has fed moral panics which see young people as ‘a political 
and security threat, a social and economic burden’ where it could have been interpreted as 
‘a “demographic gift” of dynamic, working-age, lower-dependency ratio individuals who can 
contribute to the productive and savings sectors of the economy’ (Murphy, 2012: 9). The 
shift from post-war state welfarist policies towards the embrace of neo-liberal governance 
has not meant the withdrawal of the State. Authoritarianism is not at odds with neo-liberal 
reform but serves to deepen capitalist development. In the context of high rates of 
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unemployment, underemployment and precarious working, authoritarian regimes use a 
variety of strategies ‘to control and supervise youth as well as to contain their dissent, 
politicisation, frustration and deviation from normative behaviour’ (Paciello and Pioppi, 
2017: 11). This is also true of the UK context, where the neo-liberal state simultaneously 
reduces the welfare state and governs at a distance whilst intensifying authoritarian social 
policies (King et al., forthcoming).   
 
In agreement with the overall conclusions of the P2Y programme, we suggest that we 
cannot seek to understand the way that youth is constructed in the MENA countries, the 
conditions that young people experience and the opportunities open to them in their 
transitions to adulthood and wider lives, without grasping the political economy of the 
recent decades, particularly ‘the implementation of neo-liberal reforms, the exposure to 
war, the growing securitization of migration policies and the persistence of authoritarian 
regimes’ (Paciello and Pioppi, 2017: 18). In this period, ‘state-labour-capital relations’ have 
been profoundly reconfigured with very important implications, particularly for young 
people. It has intensified experiences of insecurity and precariousness and made ‘youth’ 
even more ‘differentiated across gender, geographical and ethnic lines within and between 
countries’ (ibid.). A similar approach to understanding young people’s lives in the Global 
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